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It would seem that the rulings in these income cases would be equally
appropriate in cases providing for a fixed annuity to a fluctuating class,
for there is a basic similarity between the trust dispositions in these two
classes of cases. Both are paid in regular installments to persons who
cannot be specifically determined until the time for each separate pay-
ment has arrived, and both are subject to the rule stated above which
holds that a gift in favor of a class which may fluctuate for too long a
period is invalid. That the corpus of the trust may be invaded by the
trustee when the disposition is in annuity form would not appear to be a
material distinction in view of the fact that the entire corpus is not to be
distributed at any given time.
Had this "series of separate gifts" approach been followed in the
present case, the court, without offending the rule dealing with fluctuat-
ing classes, might have sustained the trusts to the issue of the testator's
sons for a considerable period of time. In determining who were to be
the measuring lives for the five separate trusts, the court might have used
the life of the particular son, together with the lives of those of his chil-
dren and grandchildren who were living at the testator's death.42 In this
way the trusts could have been sustained on sound legal grounds, without
error as to the nature and extent of the interests which were to be taken
by those "issue" who were living at the testator's death, or who would





There have been several highly significant rulings by the Ohio courts
reported during the past year under the labor relations heading.
ARBITRATION
Arbitrability Under Labor Contracts
Curiously enough, two decisions with reference to the question of
arbitrability under labor contracts were handed down by the same court
of appeals within a few weeks of each other. In the earlier opinion,
Judge Long ruled that an issue arising under a collective bargaining
agreement was in fact arbitrable and arbitration was ordered. In the sec-
ond case, Judge Matthews, speaking for the majority of the court, ruled
42. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUmIES § 219.2, n. 2 (4th ed. 1942).
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that the employer had been relieved from the obligation to arbitrate.
Judge Long dissented.
In Local 804 IAM v. Stillpass Transit Company,' the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and the employer provided for lay-
ing off and recalling the employees according to seniority, and for arbi-
tration of any grievances not settled after an earnest effort by the parties
themselves. The agreement further provided that any grievance must
be made in writing and served on the adverse party within ten days after
its happening. On March 4, 1960, two written "complaints," usually
referred to as grievance reports, were filed by the union stating that on
February 27 and 28 in the one case, and on February 19 to 22, in the
other, certain employees had worked in jobs to which the two grievants
had recall rights under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
In each instance a violation of the agreement was alleged.
The employer, as a basis for refusing to submit the matter to arbitra-
tion, argued that the two grievants were not in his employ at the time
and further that the complaints were not filed within ten days of the
event in question. Action was brought by the union to enforce the agree-
ment, and the common pleas court ordered the parties to arbitrate.
Without any reference to the Ohio Arbitration Act,' and seemingly
on the basis of the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate incorporated
in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, the court of
appeals upheld the contention of the union that arbitration could be
ordered, and entered a decree similar to the one entered in the trial court.
The case, according to the court, presented a typical collective bargaining
agreement, including a provision empowering an arbitration committee
to rule on all disputes pertaining to the interpretation or application of
the agreement to the facts in dispute.
With respect to the timeliness of the grievance, the court quoted the
provision of the agreement that in computing time limits for this purpose,
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays were not to be counted. The court took
judicial notice of the fact that two week-ends and one holiday fell within
the period elapsing between the earlier occurrence and the filing of the
grievance thereon, and ruled that the written grievance was filed within
the ten day limit in both instances.
In Vulcan-Cincinnati, Incorporated v. United Steelworkers of America3
an action was instituted by the employer seeking an injunction to restrain
the union and certain members thereof from carrying on a strike against
the employer in alleged violation of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the employer. A temporary restrain-
1. 171 NE.2d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
2. OHIO REV. CODE § 2711.01-.15.
3. 173 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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ing order was issued, and thereafter the defendants filed an answer ad-
mitting the existence of the collective bargaining agreement but denying
that they had in any way supported, encouraged, or taken part in the work
stoppage, contrary to the agreement. In addition to their answer, the de-
fendants filed a cross petition alleging that a controversy had arisen be-
tween the parties as a result of the discharge of two employees by the
plaintiff without proper cause, the plaintiff allegedly acting in bad faith
and failing, neglecting, and refusing to discuss or arbitrate this contro-
versy with the defendant union. The defendants alleged that the defend-
ant union had performed all the necessary conditions preliminary and
precedent to arbitration, and prayed that the court order the plaintiff to
proceed to arbitration. Apparently no answer to the cross petition was
ever filed, but the matter proceeded to trial notwithstanding. From a
ruling in the common pleas court ordering arbitration, the employer
appealed.
After stating that in the absence of a statute the courts will not at-
tempt to order litigants to proceed to arbitrate a dispute, the court made
reference to section 2711.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, but erroneously
stated that collective or individual contracts between employers and em-
ployees in respect to the terms or conditions of employment, were ex-
cepted therefrom.4 The opinion then states that the federal law, being
the supreme law of the land, would be controlling in any event and the
rights of the parties determined in accordance therewith. Finally, the
court concludes that whatever right the cross petitioners had to compel
arbitration and whatever duty the plaintiff had arose under, and were
controlled by, the terms of the contract between them.
The collective bargaining agreement in this case, as outlined in the
court's opinion, contains a five-step grievance procedure culminating in
arbitration by an impartial umpire mutually selected by the parties. Ac-
cording to the terms of this provision, differences arising between the
company and the union as to the meaning or application of the provi-
sions of the agreement, as well as any 'local trouble" arising in the plant,
"shall be settled immediately" in the succeeding steps of the grievance
procedure. The first step is between the aggrieved employee and/or
members of the grievance committee, on the one hand, and the foreman
of the department on the other. At the second step, the settlement is to
occur between the aggrieved employee and/or members of the grievance
4. The exception referred to was contained in the Ohio Arbitration Act prior to its amend-
ment in 1955. This exception was deleted by the amendment, however, and the law has been
considered applicable to collective bargaining agreements since that time. CINCINNATI BAR
ASSN. COMM. ON ARBITRATION, REPORT pt. III (b) at 4.16. The only exclusions at the
present time relate to controversies involving the valuation of property in connection with a
lease, rentals due under any lease, the value of improvements at the termination of any lease,
the appraisal of property values in connection with making or renewing any lease, or the
boundaries of real estate. OtIO REV. CODE § 2711.01.
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committee, on the one hand, and the superintendent of the department,
on the other hand. Special provision is made, however, for discharge
cases. Any employee who believes he has been unjustly dealt with has
the right to utilize the grievance procedure by omitting the first step
thereof and start "the second step within forty-eight (48) hours of the
time of suspension or discharge, Saturdays and Sundays excluded." In
no case need the subject matter of the grievance be reduced to writing
until the third step, at which point it is to be settled between the ag-
grieved employee and/or members of the grievance committee, on the
one hand, and the personnel manager, on the other.
Various disorders took place at the company's plant early in Decem-
ber and because of their participation therein, the two employees in ques-
tion were discharged on December 8. They were reinstated the same
day, restored to "full rights" on December 11, suspended on December
12, and discharged once more on December 14. It appears that many
conferences and discussions between the union and the company took
place during this period, at least some of which concerned the status of
the two employees. No formal written notice or grievance was filet],
however.
The majority of the court concluded that a person claiming to be
aggrieved must himself have performed all the conditions precedent up-
on which his rights are predicated. The parties, the court said, can by
express provision confer power upon an arbitrator to determine whether
he has jurisdiction to pass upon his own jurisdiction as well as to pass
upon the subject matter submitted; but where the arbitration agreement
contains no express provision conferring such power and there is nothing
from which it can be implied, the decision on arbitrability becomes a
matter of law for the court. Before any action can arise in favor of the
employees, according to the court, the employer must be in default, and
before the employer can be placed in default the entire process of arbitra-
tion must be exhausted. It was incumbent upon the employees, the ma-
jority said, to start the grievance procedure within forty-eight hours of
the discharge or suspension, and failing so to do, the employer was there-
by released from any obligation, and the court - not the arbitrator -
has jurisdiction so to decide. Final judgment was rendered for the em-
ployer.
Judge Long, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the view that the
discussions between the company and the union, as well as the discharges
and reinstatements, were some evidence that the company considered that
the union had performed under the provision requiring the institution of
the initial step in discharge cases within forty-eight hours. Judge Long
could not agree that the evidence was conclusive of a default on the part
of the employees, or that the forty-eight hour provision was a contractual
[VoL 13:3
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limitation under the circumstances. He felt that the company had waived
its right to this defense in any event by taking part in the negotiations
relative to this dispute. The recent decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, Judge Long felt, indicate a policy to decide disputes of this
kind through the machinery of arbitration whenever possible, resolving
doubts in favor of coverage by the arbitration agreement. He would
have ordered arbitration.
In view of the obvious confusion concerning the discharges, as well
as the apparent efforts to settle the issue within a forty-eight hour period
following the initial discharge action, there is a great deal to be said for
Judge Longs position.5
The majority opinion makes only passing reference to the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Com-
pany.' The importance and the applicability of the rule established by
the United States Supreme Court in this very area warranted much more
attention than this.7 This failure is quite inconsistent with the earlier
5. In addition to the forty-eight hour requirement, the section on discharges provided that
it was the intent that all such cases should be taken up and disposed of within five days of
the date of discharge. The general grievance section, however, provided that notification of
intent to appeal "any grievance" from step three to step four, or from step four to step five,
should be given within thirty-one calendar days. Such discrepancies are not uncommon in col-
lective bargaining agreements. It is also noted that no formal complaint or written report is re-
quired at the initial step. It is usually felt that matters of this kind can best be settled through
arbitration, utilizing men experienced and familiar with the history and special problems of
labor-management relations. This case seems to furnish an excellent example of the reason
for this rule.
6. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These cases are generally considered
to establish the rule that the courts are limited to finding whether there is a collective bargain-
ing agreement in existence, whether there is an arbitration clause, and whether there is an
allegation that a provision of the agreement has been violated. Under the rule of these cases,
if the arbitration clause is broad enough to include the alleged "dispute," then arbitration must
be ordered. For commentaries on these cases, see Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration:
The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 138 (1961); Gould, The Supreme
Court and Labor Arbitration, 12 LAB. UJ. 331 (1961); Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor
Law, October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1960); Kagel, Recent Supreme Court
Decisions and Arbitration Process, ARBrrRA'ON & PUB. POLIcY 1 (1961); Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CmH. L RE . 464 (1961);
Petro, Labor Relations Law, in 1960 ANNuAL SURVEY OF AMERIcAN LAW 131 (1961);
Snyder, What Has the Supreme Court Done to Arbitration?, 12 LAB. .J. 93 (1961); Wallen,
Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View, 63 W. VAL I. REV.
295 (1961).
7. In Vuican-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961), the
same employer brought an action under section 301 of the LMRA to recover damages claimed
to have been inflicted as a result of a strike by the union. The union moved for a stay
of the proceedings pending arbitration of the employer's complaint. The federal court
construed the grievance procedure under the contract in this case as applying only to the
employees and the union, and not to any complaint which the employer might have. The
American Manufacturing and the Warrior & Gulf and Enterprise Wheel decisions were dis-
tinguished on the ground that none of these cases involved the issue of a breach of a no-strike
clause. The right to strike, the court held, was not an arbitrable issue.
This matter may soon be settled by the United States Supreme Court itself. See Drake
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statement in the opinion that the federal law is controlling in the event
of any conflict, and it seems safe to predict that this decision will hardly
become a reliable precedent.
Designation of the Place of the Award
While on the subject of arbitration, it is also noted that the Ohio Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in the case of Ockrant v. Railway Supply
and Manufacturing Company.8 In this case it was held that in the ab-
sence of a designation of the county in which the arbitration award was
made either in the agreement to arbitrate, in the award, or in any other
place in the proceedings, the common pleas court had no jurisdiction of
a proceeding sought to be initiated by an application for an order to con-
firm the award. Based on dictum in the opinion of the court of appeals,
it has been suggested that there may be some question about the applica-
tion of the Ohio Arbitration Act if the agreement to arbitrate does not
specify the county in which the proceeding shall be held,' but the syllabus
of the opinion contains no such statement, and there should be no real
doubt on this point. The designation of the county in which the award
is made in the award itself or in some other effective way in the course
of the proceeding should be sufficient.1"
A more interesting, and perhaps more difficult, question is just where
the award is actually made. Many arbitrators, at least in labor cases,
travel many miles and frequently across state lines to conduct the arbitra-
tion hearings. The hearing usually is held at a place convenient to the
particular plant in which the issue has arisen, which is also generally the
headquarters of the local union. After the hearing, the arbitrator re-
turns to his own office and eventually signs his opinion and award there
or some place else where he may happen to be at the time. The award
is invariably transmitted to each party, at whatever address the party may
give, by mail. The arbitrator almost never returns to the place of the
hearing to make his award.
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, 287 F.2d 155, 294 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1961),'cert. granted, 30
U.S.L. WE3K 3232 (January 23, 1962).
Cases involving time limits applicable to the steps of the grievance procedure usually are
said to involve questions of procedural arbitrability. For recent decisions holding that the
broad duty to arbitrate as required under the contract should extend to cases in which questions
of procedural arbitrability have been raised. See Radio Corp. v. Ass'n of Professional Eng'r.
Personnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cit. 1961); IAM Lodge 2003 v. Hayes Corp., 43 CCH Lab.
Cas. 25637 (5th Cir. 1961); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Local 738, IBEW, 43 CCH
Lab. Cas. 25195 (5th Cir. 1961); United Steelworkers v. Philip Szeig & Sons, 42 CCH Lab.
Cas. 24439 (N.D. Ind. 1961). Contra, United Brick & Clay Workers v. Gladding, McBean
& Co., 192 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
8. 160 N.E.2d 435; aff'd, 111 Ohio App. 276, cert. denied, docket no. 36,487 (1961).
9. 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 742 (1961).
10. In the Ockrant case, the only reference to the place of the award was contained in a cov-
ering letter written by an official of the American Arbitration Association. Without dis-
cussing the point, the court in effect ruled that this was not sufficient.
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I The difficulties here may easily be imagined if the arbitrator hears
the case in Ohio but maintains an office and signs the award in a neigh-
boring state, which may frequently occur. Further problems arise if
there is a panel or arbitration board composed of three, five, or sometimes
more members, with the impartial arbitrator serving as the chairman and
the other members representing the parties equally. It is not at all un-
common for these members to reside in different parts of the state and
occasionally outside of the state. They seldom meet again, and the award
is transmitted by mail for signature.
The most sensible solution would seem to be a designation in the
award of the place where the hearing was held as the place of the award.
This undoubtedly would be the most convenient place for further judicial
proceedings to confirm or vacate the award. If a different designation is
made in the award itself, however, for whatever reason, this would appear
to satisfy the statute. If the submission agreement, which is sometimes
used, designates the county in which the arbitration is to be conducted
and the award made, this should clearly settle the problem. A written
stipulation signed by representatives of both parties and made a part of
the record at the time of the oral hearing, designating the place of the
arbitration and award, should also be sufficient to meet the requirement
of the Ohio Statute.
JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN PICKETING
In Sherlock Baking Company v. Bakery Drivers Union, Local 365"
the employer brought suit to enjoin "stranger picketing." There were no
allegations of violence or anything else which might be construed -as a
threat to the peace. The common pleas court ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction, and this was affirmed by the court of appeals. Notwith-
standing the fact that "stranger picketing" is unlawful as against the pub-
lic policy of Ohio, the court stated that since it appeared that the activity
of the defendants sought to be enjoined was arguably subject to the fed-
eral Labor Management Relations Act, the court had no jurisdiction to
determine the controversy."2
In Foley Construction Company v. Truck Drivers Local 100,"s how-
ever, the court found that it had jurisdiction where a breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union was
threatened, notwithstanding the fact that a charge had been filed by the
11. 173 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
12. The court relied upon the United State Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The result is also consistent with the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Richman Brothers Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 168
Ohio St. 560, 157 N.E.2d 101 (1959), discussed in Teple, Survey of Ohio Law - Labor Law,
11 WEsT. REs. L REv. 396, 401 (1960).
13. 172 NXE.2d 170 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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union with the NLRB and a complaint had been issued against the em-
ployer pursuant thereto.
The employer in this case had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the Ohio Conference of Teamsters, a division of the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, which had geographical jurisdic-
tion over Local 100. The petition joined the International, the Ohio
Conference, and Local 100 as defendants and charged them with at-
tempting through picketing to force it to breach its contract, further al-
leging instances of violence, intimidation, and threats of bodily harm. A
temporary restraining order was issued by the court and thereafter Local
100 filed a charge with the NLRB, as a result of which a complaint
against the plaintiff was issued. Two days later, Local 100 filed a motion
to dissolve the restraining order and to dismiss the petition on the basis
that the court did not have jurisdiction. The local argued that it was the
designated representative of the plaintiff's truck drivers, that the plain-
tiff's refusal to bargain with it was an unfair labor practice under the
federal LMRA, and that since these matters came within the purview of
the federal act, the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction and the state court
could not assume jurisdiction thereof. In reply, the plaintiff argued that
the United States Supreme Court had recognized two exceptions to the
federal preemption doctrine, namely, (1) cases of violence, and (2)
breach of contract. The contract in question contained a no-strike pro-
vision.
After a careful review of the federal court decisions as well as deci-
sions in several other states, the court concluded that it was not the intent
of Congress to give the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over
matters of law such as the enforcement of contracts; nor, the court con-
cluded, was exclusive jurisdiction vested in the federal courts in this re-
spect. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court in Standard Oil Company v. Oil Workers
International Union,'4 wherein Judge William K. Thomas ruled that
there was nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act which could be regarded as
protecting concerted activities which had as their purpose possible and
probable inducement of breach of contract.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
In State v. Local 5760, United Steelworkers of America5 the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that where union officials during a strike failed to
14. 144 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio C.P. 1957), discussed in Teple, Survey of Ohio Law - Labor
Law, 9 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 338 (1958). As in the Standard Oil case, the court in the Foley
Construction Company case did not consider the matter of the alleged violence, although
specifically recognizing its jurisdiction to restrain such violence.
15. 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 446 supra.
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make reasonable efforts to prevent interference by members with the
processes of a court, particularly where there was evidence of actual ap-
proval or participation in such conduct, the officials and the union itself
were subject to a charge of contempt of court.
The clerk of the common pleas court had issued four writs of replevin
to the sheriff ordering him to take possession of ten truck-trailers loaded
with aluminum products which were then located on company property
where a strike was in progress. The sheriff proceeded to the gate of the
struck plant in his official automobile, accompanied by ten truck-tractors
and their drivers to be used to remove the trailers from within the plant.
The vice president of the striking union was present at the gate with
several others when the sheriff approached and presented him with the
writs. The gate was blocked by automobiles, however, and they were
not removed despite the sheriff's explanation that it was his duty to go
into the plant to execute the order of the court. The sheriff left with the
union official and called his office from a nearby phone booth for further
instructions. When he returned to the plant gate, the automobiles had
been removed but in their place was a line of men standing closely to-
gether and blocking the gate. At this point, the president of the union
was also present. Although the sheriff testified that he had discussed this
matter with the local president the day before, it was admitted that the
seventy-five men engaged in picketing on the day in question had received
no prior instruction concerning the possibility of the writs being served.
The union officials finally offered to allow the sheriff to enter the plant
for the purpose of placing court seals upon the trailers, but when the
sheriff started to drive into the plant without saying what he would do,
his vehicle was jostled by the men surrounding it.
A contempt charge was thereafter filed against the defendants, a hear-
ing was had pursuant to the terms of section 2705.03 of the Ohio Revised
Code, and the two officials, together with the union itself, were found
guilty and fined $500.00 each.'" The court of appeals determined that
the sheriff's duty in executing the writ of replevin did not require him to
take actual physical possession of the property involved, and on this basis
reversed the judgment of the common pleas court and discharged the de-
fendants. In a lengthy opinion, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court.
The court ruled that the defendants' interference with the sheriff in
his attempt to execute the court's order dearly constituted an offense
against the dignity and process of the court. The purpose of the penalty
imposed upon the defendants, it was said, was to punish rather than to
16. The defendants were also charged with violation of section 2917.07 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code, which makes it a felony to interfere with an officer of the court in the discharge
of his duty, but the grand jury returned a "no bill" to this charge.
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